Introduction
China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP) will be a key test of the direction of the country’s climate policy. As the central framework for national development, the FYP will shape energy, industrial and emissions priorities for the next five years (2026-2030) [1]. The significance of the plan lies not only in its targets, but in what those targets reveal about the balance China is striking between economic growth and continued dependence on fossil fuels. Although this plan does not yet signal a major shift in climate ambition, it does not preclude more decisive action in future planning cycles.
China’s policy architecture
On the 12th March 2026, China approved the 15th FYP at its annual ‘two sessions’ event, which refers to two national meetings [2]. These meetings include plenary sessions from the National People’s Congress, the top legislative body in China, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the country’s political advisory body [3][4]. During the ‘two sessions’, the Communist Party of China (CPC) outlines the major development visions of the country, which have been ongoing since 1953 [5].
Since the 12th FYP (2011-2015), climate targets have become standard features with carbon and energy intensity included as the two key indicators for climate and environment targets [6]. The 15th FYP continues this trajectory under President Xi Jinping’s leadership [6].
The 15th FYP’s climate provisions
The 15th FYP highlights the continuity of ‘self-reliance’ that is often showcased in the CPC’s strategic ambitions [7]. It sets a 17% reduction target of CO2 emissions by 2030, compared with the 18% target placed in the 14th FYP [7]. The plan also commits to raising non-fossil energy from 21.7% in 2025 to 25% of total energy consumption by 2030, with a prioritisation of doubling non-fossil capacity to 4,700 GW by 2035 [7].
Furthermore, the 15th FYP introduces a suite of measures to enhance climate governance, including the establishment of improved carbon footprint standards and national emissions factor databases [1]. While the phase-down of coal consumption was mentioned in the 15th FYP, it still remains an important security reserve. As for renewables, they are prioritised for key industries such as transport [7]. Finally and most importantly, no absolute emissions cap is specified [6].
What the 15th FYP reveals
China’s non-fossil fuel energy targets will help the country align with its 2035 Nationally Determined Contribution, which is a non-legally binding climate plan under the Paris Agreement [8]. But this should not be mistaken for climate leadership in a deeper sense. For China, the FYP’s function more as an industrial strategy rather than being motivated by climate concerns, as evidenced by their strong emphasis on ‘self-reliance’ [9]. Its 17% from 18% CO2 emissions reduction target marks a retreat from the previous plan’s level of climate ambition [7]. Ultimately, the lack of an absolute emissions cap permits the continued investment in and construction of new fossil fuel infrastructure, which is fundamentally at odds with the direction we need to be moving in [10].
The problem is that China has been able to expand green industries without resolving the contradiction at the heart of its energy model, which is fossil fuels. The 15th FYP considers coal a reserve option to use if green technologies fail, as it occupies a privileged position in the national energy system [5]. It is defended not because it is compatible with climate stability, but because it offers employment and political reassurance [10]. For instance, over 3 million people are directly employed in China’s coal mining and coal power industries, making coal not only an energy source but a major source of livelihoods and political stability [11]. As a result, the country’s green transition has often been layered on top of a fossil-fuel foundation rather than replacing it.
From the perspective of the Paris Agreement, the 15th FYP is likely to be ambiguous. On the one hand, it may help China strengthen its ability to peak emissions and expand non-fossil energy. On the other hand, it may remain too weak to put the country on a trajectory compatible with limiting warming to 1.5 °C [8]. The central weakness is that China continues to rely heavily on emissions intensity targets rather than firm absolute emissions reductions.
Overall, the 15th FYP is unlikely to be a clear win for the climate. It may strengthen China’s role as the world’s leading clean-tech power and accelerate parts of the energy transition. But unless it confronts coal more directly and replaces intensity-based rhetoric with absolute emissions responsibility, it will be less than transformative. Hopefully, however, it helps lay stronger foundations for more decisive planning cycles, leading to bolder future climate action.
