

ClimaTalk COP30 Debrief



WEEK 2

ClimaTalk has tracked COP30 negotiations and is making them accessible for youth at home and on the ground. For more information see the COP30 section on our website [here](#), and follow us on Instagram (@climataalk) and LinkedIn. You can also download our guide to “Decoding UNFCCC Language” [here](#).

Check out our Week 1 Debrief here: [ClimaTalk COP30 Week 1 Debrief](#)

To find the texts of the adopted decisions within the “Bélem Political Package” you can visit this link: [Belém Political Package | UNFCCC](#)

To find all texts, as well as various iterations throughout the two weeks, you can check CarbonBrief’s tracker here: [Interactive: Tracking negotiating texts at the COP30 climate summit - Carbon Brief](#)

Cover Decision and Roadmaps

Countries agreed on a cover decision called the “Global Mutirão” Decision, available [here](#). The text calls “for efforts to triple adaptation finance” by 2035 (weakened from the initial 2030 draft), and decides to launch the presidency-led “Bélem mission to 1.5°C” and the voluntary “Global Implementation Accelerator” to “keep 1.5°C within reach”. The text does not mention fossil fuels. It also does not include a reference to the roadmap to phasing out fossil fuels, which [over 80 countries](#) had called for, nor does it include a roadmap to end deforestation (which was backed by around [45 countries](#)).

During the closing plenary on Saturday, 22nd November, COP President Corrêa do Lago announced that the Brazilian Presidency would create both a deforestation and a fossil-fuel roadmap - separate to the COP negotiation process. The fossil-fuel roadmap would be guided by the [First International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels](#) co-hosted by Colombia and the Netherlands from 28-29 April 2026 in Santa Marta, Colombia.

COP? SB63? CMA7? CMP20? - What happens when?

During the first week of COP, Parties negotiate under the guidance of the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies, that are the **Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)** chaired by Julia Gardiner (Australia) and the **Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)** chaired by Adonia Ayebare (Uganda). Similar to the SBs in June, these meetings consist largely of technical and negotiation phases, thus laying the groundwork for adopting decisions and reaching formal agreements under the **COP Presidency** (this year: Brazil). Technically speaking, while negotiations during COP go on for two weeks, the meetings during the first week are guided by the SBs Chair while those during week happen under Brazilian Presidency. Therefore, it can

happen that when no decision or draft text was reached until the end of week 1, negotiations start anew during the second week - that is, unless Parties agree to continue working on the old documents.

Whereas the **Conference of Parties (COP)** is the highest body under the UNFCCC and thus deals with overarching climate governance, the [Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement \(CMA\)](#) also reunites Parties that are members of the Paris Agreement to work towards the effective implementation of the Paris Agreement. Although the Paris Agreement celebrates its 10-year anniversary this year, Belém only hosts CMA7. COP30 also serves as CMP20, that is the 20th meeting of the [Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol \(CMP\)](#). In this framework, Parties that signed the Kyoto Protocol aim to oversee its implementation and take decisions to reach this goal.

Negotiations Across the Rooms

Negotiations do not remain within negotiations rooms but play out across various rooms, topics, and working groups. This means that Parties act strategically, often willing to compromise on one topic while asking other Parties to agree to their priorities in another room. For instance, while some Parties were willing to step back from some of their demands under the Mitigation Work Programme to reach a decision, they were hoping for their opponents to do the same for the sake of reaching a decision under the Just Transition Work Programme. Overall, this strategizing can be compared to playing chess. Sometimes, sacrifices must be made in one negotiation room in order to reach an overarching goal of the Party's strategy; losing a pawn, but keeping your Queen!

Recurring Disagreements

Although every negotiation centers on a different topic (e.g. mitigation, adaptation, finance), some conflicts recur in various rooms. During the first week at COP30, developed and developing countries disagreed on including language on unilateral trade measures, the 1.5°C temperature goal, and the provision of finance from developed to developing countries (in line with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement)

Unilateral Trade Measures: actions taken by a country to restrict or open its trade with others, however without waiting for agreement from other countries (e.g. tariffs, sanctions, etc.). They can be instrumentalized as a tool for foreign policy or simply to achieve domestic objectives.

- **Developing Countries** argue that these measures can potentially hinder their sustainable development, exacerbate poverty, and increase the divide between the Global North and the Global South.
- **Developed countries** disagree with this interpretation of unilateral measures, arguing that they are a way to prevent carbon leakage and encourage global climate action.
- **Civil Society Groups advocate for a BAM (Belém Action Mechanism) instead of CBAM** (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism) to reflect the right to development, honor equity, and promote national sovereignty.

1.5° Temperature Goal: This goal, a prominent key objective of the Paris Agreement, aims to limit global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Albeit politically relevant, recent scientific assessments suggest

that this critical threshold could already be breached by 2030 unless greenhouse gas emissions are reduced significantly.

- Developed Nations, specifically EU, UK, Australia, and Norway [advocate](#) for its inclusion in the text
- Other Parties, including Egypt and China want this understated
- Other developing Parties, including Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh frame the 1.5°C temperature goal as a matter of survival and hence advocate for increasing national ambitions in the NDCs

Provision of finance: “Developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation” (Article 9.1 Paris Agreement)

- Like-minded developing countries (LMDCs) reminded developed countries of their responsibility under Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement, advocated for an implementation of this paragraph and proposed the implementation of a work programme to foster discussions. In contrast, Australia emphasized prioritizing the implementation of the NCGQ, pointing out that it already encompasses Article 9.1
- AOSIS, Norway, Australia and others called for a ‘response plan’: Parties who included ranges in their newly submitted NDCs should aim to move towards the more ambitious ends in their plans. In addition, donor countries are encouraged to include finance in their NDCs)

TOPIC UPDATES

The topics that are covered in this update are:

- Global Stocktake
- Just Transition
- Loss & Damage
- Climate Finance
- Article 6
- Gender
- Food & Agriculture
- ACE (Action for Climate Empowerment)
- NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions)
- Mitigation
- Adaptation
- NAPs (National Adaptation Plans)
- Oceans
- Biodiversity

This debrief was completed on the evening of Saturday 22nd November. ***Please note that we have done our best to ensure that all updates are accurate, up to date and cover the most important issues and developments. However, if you notice a mistake or missing piece of information, please email us at office@climatalk.org with the subject line “Week 2 Correction” and we will correct and update this live document.***

Global Stocktake

Discussions on the UAE dialogue became more constructive, and convergences started to appear. Several Parties were willing to work on ALLAC’s proposal on scope, which included all GST outcomes but a focus on means of implementation. India, China, and the LMDCs continued to stress that the Dialogue must not duplicate the GST, while discussions on output continued along the same lines. In the end, the final text produced provides a balanced compromise among Parties.

Regarding the procedural elements, there was consensus on the need for more time for the output phase, but several Parties emphasised that this cannot be at the expense of the technical phase; intersessional work was seen as a possible compromise. On scientific input, the EU, UK, and AOSIS continued to emphasise the primacy of the IPCC as the source of best available science, a point refused by LMDCs, China, and others. In the end, few concrete changes to the GST process were adopted.

AT A GLANCE:

- Modalities for the UAE dialogue were finally agreed upon.
- The final UAE text represents a balanced compromise.
- Few concrete changes were made to the GST process.
- While the critical importance of the IPCC to the GST was recognised, it was not labelled as the best available science.

Just Transition

Years of work may be about to pay off for all those pushing for a Just Transition. Though all Parties supported the principles of equity and fairness that the Just Transition sought to implement, there was no plan in place that Parties could agree on to actually achieve this in policy.

This week, came BAM (Bélem Action Mechanism for a Just Transition) - a proposal for a mechanism that would force countries to coordinate on their just transition work, and pressure developed countries to share technology, finance, or at least best practices with low-income countries. Civil society groups called for BAM with increasing urgency over the course of the week, building support among developing countries. The EU counter-proposed an action plan that focused on incorporating Just Transition principles into existing UNFCCC mechanisms, rather than creating a new one and risk duplicating existing measures. Finally, the G77 and China endorsed the mechanism, and the final text submitted on Friday November 21st heralds a just transition mechanism to be recommended for operationalisation at the next Conference in 2026.

Unfortunately, negotiations were slowed down once again by diversions into the thorny topic of trade. Certain key Parties and blocs, particularly the Arab Group, have used discussions to campaign against the imposition of CBAMs (Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms), an issue they did not see resolved within Just Transition negotiations; parties such as India and the LMDCs continually criticised unilateral trade measures and the concept of prescriptivist policy. The final document does not condemn any such measures, or affirm additional responsibility on developed countries to cut emissions, as some Parties might like; nonetheless, the text acknowledges the financial limitations of developing countries.

AT A GLANCE:

- The BAM (Belém Action Mechanism for a Just Transition) gained strong momentum at the negotiations, with developing countries and civil society organizations pushing for a new mechanism to drive global cooperation on just transition and enable exchanges on best practices.
- Despite EU resistance (favoring the integration of just transition efforts in existing frameworks), the final text recommends developing a just transition mechanism for operationalization in 2026.
- Climate finance and unilateral trade measures remain contentious issues that continue to slow down progress.
- Though the outcome does not specifically mention transitioning away from fossil fuels, it acknowledges the role of the mechanism and work programme to help achieve sustainable energy for all and maintain 1.5 degrees.

Loss & Damage

During Week 2, negotiations on the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) highlighted tension between developing countries and some developed countries. The LDCs and Arab Group called for expanded access to the Fund, a clear resource mobilization strategy, and explicit reference to the historical responsibility of developed countries (paragraph 12, COP28). The EU, supported by Japan, opposed these references.

On the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and Santiago Network, informal-informal consultations led to agreement on removing the “particularly vulnerable” qualifier, allowing all developing countries to submit funding requests. AILAC confirmed the compromise text, and Switzerland pledged an additional 1 million Swiss francs to the Santiago Network, complementing prior contributions. Parties stressed the importance of funding for operationalizing the Santiago Network and supporting the WIM ExCom.

AT A GLANCE:

- LDCs and the Arab Group stressed that the FRLD text does not fully address developing countries' concerns, calling for expanded access, a clear resource mobilization strategy, and recognition of

historical responsibility from developed countries.

- EU & Japan oppose including references to COP28 paragraph 12, arguing it singles out specific text.
- On the WIM, parties agreed to remove the “particularly vulnerable” qualifier so all developing countries can submit funding requests.
- Santiago Network: Switzerland pledges additional funding, highlighting need for operational support and contributions to WIM ExCom.

Climate Finance

Throughout week 2, climate finance continued to be a priority for developing country parties. The week started with negotiations on the biennial communication report on Article 9.5. Developing country groups repeatedly called for the establishment of clearer reporting methods, by using common templates and specified timeframes. The goal was to improve finance mobilization and increase accountability for developed countries. An updated CMA draft text was released on Tuesday night, but progress on the text has evidently slowed down through the week.

In many finance negotiations, we heard appeals from developing countries to triple adaptation finance in addition to the existing NCQG, and for the establishment of a clear quantified target for developed countries, to be rooted in grant-based concessions. Developed countries remained open to increasing adaptation funds, but strongly opposed the idea of going beyond the established NCQG. While this issue is addressed in the latest version of the “Mutirao”, the language lacks the concreteness, and the urgency, that parties like AGN and the Arab Group were requesting.

In response to developing country parties' concerns, the latest Mutirao text also introduced a two-year work programme on climate finance, which clearly includes discussion on article 9.1, and convened a ministerial round table to discuss how to enact the NCQG. Divergence persists on these items, as these decisions remain too vague for AOSIS, AGN, LDCs and others.

AT A GLANCE:

- Developing countries kept climate finance as a central priority in week 2, urging clearer Article 9.5 reporting, scaling up of adaptation funds, and focus on grant-based finance.
- “Global Mutirão” text introduced a two-year work programme on climate finance and a ministerial round table on implementing the NCQG.
- The cover text falls short of establishing clear targets as requested by AOSIS, LDCs and others.

Article 6

The second week of COP30 saw Article 6 negotiations move beyond technical disagreements to secure essential political and financial outcomes for the Paris Agreement's carbon markets. A critical breakthrough was achieved for the centralised Paris Agreement Crediting Mechanism (PACM), overseen by the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body, with the final decision authorising a \$26.8 million transfer from the legacy Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Trust Fund. This capital, which includes up to \$5 million dedicated to capacity-building in developing nations, signals the end of the Kyoto-era market and provides the PACM Supervisory Body with the funds necessary to accelerate its operational work.

While this financial matter was resolved, the most difficult technical issues relating to market integrity were managed through strategic delay. Negotiators prioritised stability, postponing decisions on contentious questions, such as the specifics of managing permanence and carbon reversals in land and nature based projects, until subsequent negotiations planned for 2026. This delay allows the PACM to stabilise its

foundational processes but signals a slower pace for the immediate approval of new nature-based methodologies. Furthermore, a proposal to block all International Transferred Mitigation Outcomes (ITMOs) under Article 6.2 that receive any inconsistency flags during the Technical Expert Review (TER) process was rejected, preserving a necessary degree of sovereign flexibility in cross-border trading.

While the market mechanisms gained financial footing, governance and procedural debates concluded with mixed results. The conference deferred any attempt to revisit term limits for the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body until 2028, this was intended to maintain stability during this phase of market setup. However, concerns regarding transparency persist, while the final text was agreed, the operational procedures of key expert-panel meetings may continue to limit public visibility. Overall, the final Article 6 outcomes from COP30 balance the imperative for operational progress with the need to defer contentious integrity issues, ensuring the market mechanisms remain politically viable for the near term while setting the stage for deeper, high-stakes debates in the coming years.

AT A GLANCE:

- The final decision secured a transfer of \$26.8 million from the CDM Trust Fund to the Article 6.4 PACM, with \$5M ring-fenced for capacity-building.
- Decisions on complex technical questions, including the definitive rules for managing permanence and carbon reversals in land-based projects, were formally postponed until 2026.
- A proposal to ban all trades flagged during the Technical Expert Review (TER) process under Article 6.2 was rejected, maintaining trading flexibility.
- Term limits for the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body will not be revisited until 2028, ensuring governance stability during the operational phase.
- Despite progress, concerns remain over the transparency of decision-making, as some expert-panel meetings may continue to be held behind closed doors.

Gender

The second week of COP30 firmly moved gender negotiations into the political phase. After days of limited progress, Chile and Sweden were appointed as ministerial facilitators and began conducting rapid, high-level consultations with each negotiating bloc. These meetings focused on the most sensitive elements of the new Gender Action Plan (GAP), including gender-responsive climate finance, language on girls and women of African descent, and ongoing disputes over terminology. Although some blocs expressed openness to finding landing zones, positions remained deeply polarized.

At the same time, significant gender-related risks emerged outside the official gender track. Several negotiation streams — including Just Transition and Mitigation — saw attempts to narrow or remove the term “gender” through footnotes or alternative formulations. Such efforts would allow unilateral reinterpretation of already agreed UNFCCC language, threatening the integrity of multilateral commitments and creating spillover risks for finance, ambition, and implementation. Civil society groups issued strong warnings about these regressions.

Following a series of closed consultations, the new GAP was adopted on Saturday. Crucially, the final text preserves established UNFCCC language on gender and contains no footnotes proposing alternative definitions. Nevertheless, in the closing plenary, the Russian Federation, Uruguay, and Paraguay issued statements asserting their interpretation of “gender” as referring solely to biological sex.

AT A GLANCE:

- Across other negotiation tracks, such as Just Transition and Mitigation, several Parties attempted to dilute or reinterpret the term gender, raising concerns about potential rollbacks and risks for implementation and ambition.
- Following two days of ministerial consultations, the new Belém Gender Action Plan was adopted with important advances — including recognition of care work, environmental defenders, gender-based violence, and explicit reference to Afro-descendant women and girls.
- While the final text preserves agreed UNFCCC language and excludes any footnotes redefining “gender,” gaps remain in finance and implementation. The Women & Gender Constituency warns that without adequate resources, indicators, and political will, the GAP risks remaining largely symbolic.

Food & Agriculture

Food and agriculture were featured in the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security (SJWA) in week 1 and the Global Goal on Adaptation in week 2. Agriculture and food systems panelists warned that climate finance is not bringing projects to scale rapidly enough to meet the moment. The SJWA recognized that the food system is locked in a cycle of being threatened by climate change while contributing $\frac{1}{3}$ of greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change.

At the closing plenary, food and agriculture featured prominently at COP30, with deep divisions over science, sovereignty, and financing. Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay insisted that agricultural and land-use measures must remain nationally determined, rejecting any prescriptive sectoral approaches. Panama, Colombia, and Sierra Leone criticized the weakened GGA indicators, arguing they erased years of expert work vital for agricultural resilience. African Group and LDCs stressed that without scaled-up adaptation finance, countries cannot protect food systems or implement NAPs. Forest-rich nations like Colombia and Honduras emphasized that halting deforestation is essential for sustainable food systems.

The SJWA concluded that multilateral and national dialogues are necessary between policymakers, food system, climate, and biodiversity experts, because there are broad implications for food and agriculture reform; land tenure, biodiversity, and water scarcity can also be affected by agricultural policy. For more meaningful dialogue coming soon, cross-country learning will take place from February to April in the UN Food Systems Coordination Hub. The current mandate of the SJWA began in 2022 and runs out at COP31 next year.

AT A GLANCE:

- Agrifood systems were featured in the Sharm el-Sheikh Joint Work and the Global Goal on Adaptation.
- While 97% of national climate plans (NDCs) acknowledge the importance of agriculture for climate resilience, most nations are not taking the initiative on agrifood policy.
- Food system reforms are intrinsically linked to biodiversity, land degradation, and water crises, so there is a need for continued multilateral dialogue between stakeholders.

ACE (Action for Climate Empowerment)

During Week 2 of COP30 the draft decision/CP.30 on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) was adopted, reaffirming the importance of climate education, public awareness, public participation, and capacity-building as cross-cutting priorities in global climate action. The Matters relating to Action for Climate Empowerment decision session proceedings published on the 19th of November, welcomed the 2025 ACE Dialogue and noted progress under the Glasgow Work Programme. It set plans for a 2026 ACE Dialogue and technical workshop to review effectiveness, address gaps, and shape a new action plan, all subject to available funding. ACE was formally integrated into the [Global Climate Action Agenda](#) outcomes report, ensuring that social

empowerment measures will be tracked alongside finance, mitigation, and adaptation. This marks a significant step in embedding ACE into the broader climate governance framework, giving it greater visibility and accountability in future COP processes.

AT A GLANCE:

- The draft decision/CP.30 on Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) was adopted during Week 2 of COP30, reaffirming climate education, public awareness, public participation, and capacity-building as priorities.
- Proceedings published on 19 November welcomed the 2025 ACE Dialogue and noted progress under the Glasgow Work Programme.
- Plans were set for a 2026 ACE Dialogue and technical workshop to review effectiveness, address gaps, and shape a new action plan, subject to funding.
- ACE was integrated into the Global Climate Action Agenda outcomes report, ensuring social empowerment measures are tracked alongside finance, mitigation, and adaptation.

NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions)

By the end of COP30, countries made significant progress on their Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) submissions, with 122 updated NDCs filed (up from just 5% at the February deadline) although the combined ambition still falls short of the emission reductions needed to meet the 1.5 °C goal. Countries also advanced on Biennial Transparency (BTR) submissions, with 131 countries (67%) submitting their BTRs by the end of COP. However, there were still deep divides within NDC discussions.

LDCs, AOSIS, and many developed countries pressed for accelerated ambition and sectoral pathways and a 1.5 °C roadmap, while others (Arab Group, LMDCs, Africa Group, Qatar) resisted any approaches tying ambition to decarbonization, prioritizing development instead. The presidency decided to adopt a transition away from fossil fuels (TAFF) Roadmap to address these concerns. Given that this is a non-negotiated outcome, and there is no guidance for NDCs to be resubmitted, it will be incredibly important to keep pressure on this roadmap as a way to keep 1.5° within reach.

There also was disagreement over the role of finance within NDC discussions, with developing countries calling for stronger commitments on adaptation finance and support for NDC implementation, while the EU and IG argued that linking ambition to finance risks reopening negotiations on the NCQG.

AT A GLANCE:

- Only 5% of countries met their February deadline to submit their updated 2035 climate plans. By the closing of COP, 122 countries had submitted with the rest urged to act quickly.
- New NDCs collectively project a 12% drop in global emissions by 2035, which is nowhere near the 60% cut needed to meet the 1.5 °C goal of the Paris Agreement.
- Given addressing failing NDCs were not initially on the agenda, LDCs, AOSIS, and many developed countries pushed for accelerated action, sectoral guidance, and a clear roadmap to 1.5°C. In contrast, the African Group, LMDCs, Arab Group, and Qatar resisted these pushes - rejecting any action to raise ambition and, emphasizing low-carbon development instead.

Mitigation

Discussions under the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) focused largely on the Informal Note released after Week 1, which outlines proposed directions for strengthening collective mitigation efforts. Parties welcomed the progress reflected in the note but emphasized the need for clearer guidance on its structure, focus areas, and how it will shape future work.

Separately, discussions also highlighted the proposed digital platform. Parties stressed that the platform should be enhanced to better support countries in preparing and submitting mitigation projects, attract investment, and help unlock climate finance, particularly for developing countries. Delegates underscored the importance of ensuring that the platform is well-structured, user-friendly, and able to integrate cross-sectoral approaches.

Recommendations were shared on improving both the Informal Note and the digital platform, including enhancing transparency, strengthening support for developing countries, and improving usability and overall effectiveness.

The topics for next year's dialogues under the MWP were not specified in the final text. Colombia objected to the MWP during the closing plenary (after it had been gavelled through by the COP President) demanding that specific text on dialogues mentioning the transition away from fossil fuels be added. Following a suspension of the plenary, the COP President confirmed the MWP was accepted but requested further work in Bonn next year.

AT A GLANCE:

- Much of the discussions centred around the potential development of a digital platform, including calls to strengthen the digital platform's functionality, accessibility, and support for developing countries.
- Parties also discussed the Informal Note released after Week 1, which outlines proposed directions for strengthening collective mitigation efforts.
- Emphasis on improving transparency and usability across both the Informal Note and the platform.
- No specification regarding upcoming dialogues in the final text which led to Colombia's objection during the closing plenary demanding that specific text on dialogues mentioning the transition away from fossil fuels be added.

Adaptation

Adaptation, one of the most pressing negotiation streams at COP30, defied expectation, delaying the concrete allocation of funds and putting off defining the indicators which would measure progress under the GGA (Global Goal on Adaptation). During the second week, the number of bracketed (undecided) parts of the GGA text doubled to almost 100.

Over the past two years, experts worked to reduce a 10,000 potential indicators that would allow measuring progress under the GGA to just 100.

The African and Arab groups pushed for an open discussion on indicators to continue for the next two years, as the "Belém-Addis vision". Currently, 59 proposed indicators are referred to in the Annex of the GGA text. However, their specific requirements and intricate details on how financing can be applied could be setting up more barriers for developing countries to reach funds and take action.

Mentioned in the "global mutirão" decision, the call to triple adaptation finance by 2035 was made and echoed across different constituencies. The call remains vague, not specifying which Parties should be contributing, and pushes back the original deadline by five years. Multiple Parties were vocal in opposing the final draft of the GGA, including many Latin American states (including Colombia, Panama, Paraguay and Argentina), and the EU and Canada, due to the omission of a fossil fuel phaseout and concerns that the indicators had been altered with very little notice or time for reflection and discussion. Without a roadmap to cut out fossil fuels in the final UNFCCC text, Colombia announced that the nation would host the First International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels, to be held in April 2026, outside of official UN processes.

AT A GLANCE:

- During the second week, the number of bracketed (undecided) parts of the GGA (Global Goal on Adaptation) text doubled to almost 100.

- The final text includes an annex of 59 of the possible 100 indicators as well as plans for a 2-year “Belém-Addis vision” to further refine them.
- During the closing plenary, the decision was gavelled through by the COP President but several Parties including the EU, Latin American countries, and Canada voiced criticism and stated they could not support the outcome.
- The call to triple adaptation finance by 2035 was mentioned in the “global mutirão” decision.

NAPs (National Adaptation Plans)

Across four informal consultations under SBI 12(d), Parties engaged in detailed but often contentious negotiations on the draft text for National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). Discussions focused on midterm reviews, Means of Implementation (MOI), support for developing countries, links to the Global Stocktake, and the role of private sector finance. Despite the shaky negotiations at the start and towards the end, COP30 unveiled meaningful progress on National Adaptation Plans, demonstrating renewed commitment to scaling adaptation action through coordination, financing, and clearer global tracking.

AT A GLANCE:

- COP30 formally adopted the National Adaptation Plans (NAP) decision as part of the final Belém Package.
- Developing countries have made progress on NAPs, but still face major finance, capacity, and technology gaps.
- 71 developing countries submitted new and updated NAPs, alongside multiple sectoral plans and submissions from developed countries.
- The COP30 decision called for tripling adaptation finance by 2035, but the commitment is non-binding and lacks a clear baseline, with the welcoming of funding approvals of USD 60.3M (LDCF) for LDC NAP formulation and USD 320M (GCF) for 144 readiness and adaptation planning grants.
- COP30 set the next full assessment of NAP progress for 2030 (COP35), with preparatory work beginning in 2029.

Oceans

On the 18th of November, Brazil and France - supported by 21 other countries - launched the Task Force on Oceans, which will seek to better integrate the ocean into the UNFCCC process. The Task Force will build on the Blue NDC Challenge - a pre-existing initiative aimed at incorporating the ocean into NDCs - and work towards implementing ocean-based solutions to climate change through the UNFCCC.

The 19th of November saw the launch of the Saltmarsh Breakthrough, an initiative aimed at scaling-up saltmarsh conservation and restoration. It seeks to mobilise \$5 billion for saltmarshes by 2030, conserving and restoring over 500,000 hectares of this vital blue carbon habitat. It also encourages parties to include saltmarshes in their NDCs.

AT A GLANCE:

- 18th of November: The Task Force on Oceans was launched, spearheaded by Brazil and France, bringing together 23 countries to integrate the ocean into the UNFCCC process, in particular into parties NDCs.
- 19th of November: The Saltmarsh Breakthrough was launched, with the first ever saltmarsh-focused event held at a UNFCCC COP.

- Throughout the week, the Ocean Pavilion continued to host discussions relating to ocean-based climate action, covering topics including human rights at sea, biodiversity preservation, and the blue economy.

Biodiversity

After week 1 when the Presidency had discussions on whether to continue synergies to week 2 or kick it to SBSTA64, but decided to continue discussions into week 2. A block of countries wanted a draft text with substantive outcomes on Rio Synergies. However, another block of countries, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, disagreed on the basis of procedure saying there wasn't enough time for countries to do submissions raising issues of transparency and inclusiveness. For mitigation a text remains that mentions synergies and the importance of conserving and sustainably managing forests but with no MOI. In the Mutirao Text the text is weak on ecosystems and any reference to a deforestation roadmap was removed. In the GGA (Global Goal on Adaptation), the number of indicators related to ecosystems went from ten to six.

The Tropical Forest Forever Facility (TFFF), a mechanism separate to the UNFCCC which was proposed by the Brazilian government ahead of COP30, received \$6.6 billion so far in investment, far short of its original \$25 billion goal.

AT A GLANCE:

- Week 1 disagreements on continuing “synergies” talks led to Week 2 discussions, with some countries demanding substantive draft text and others (led by Saudi Arabia) objecting on procedural grounds.
- A compromise to draft text and reopen submissions failed to satisfy Saudi Arabia, leading to arguments over the presidency’s authority and a Secretariat presentation on transparency.
- Mitigation and “mutirão” texts include only weak or minimal language on ecosystems, forests, and deforestation; related GGA indicators were reduced from ten to six.
- The TFFF (Tropical Forest Forever Facility) has raised \$6.6B - well below its \$25B target.